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In my commentary, I will first elaborate on why the theory of criticism merits attention when 
you take an interest in argumentation. Second, I comment on Johnson’s distinction between 
criticism and objection. My ideas about this go back to the OSSA conference in 2009, when I 
commented on Doug Walton’s paper called “Objections, Rebuttals and Refutations” (Walton 
2010; van Laar 2010). Walton’s paper dealt with types of criticism, and he made some 
headway in the confusing terminology in this area. In my commentary, back then, I 
distinguished a number of parameters that might be useful for characterizing the various types 
of criticism in a more or less systematic way. Back in Groningen, Erik Krabbe and I wrote a 
paper about these parameters, called “The Ways of Criticism” (Krabbe and van Laar 2011), 
and my commentary today is partly based on ideas from that paper.  
Criticism is essential to argument production and analysis. For normally, 
argumentation grows and develops as a result of being fed with, what I use as a generic term, 
critical reactions. How about the argument’s illative core: Why would a premise be advanced 
in support of a thesis? Because, apparently, someone has called the thesis into question or the 
arguers chooses to anticipate such doubts. How about the argument’s dialectical tier: Why are 
further critical reactions taken into account and responded to? Because, apparently, there is 
someone who entertains these critical considerations, or who should do so, and the arguer 
aims at rationally convincing this critic. Critical reactions have a steering function when it 
comes to production of argument and an explanatory function when it comes to the analysis of 
argument. 
Criticism is also essential to argument quality. One aspect of the evaluation of 
arguments is the extent to which it engages adequately with the critical reactions that confront 
it, and from a dialectical viewpoint this is even the primary normative stance towards 
argument quality. Critical reactions, thus, have a testing function when it comes to the 
assessment of argumentation. 
Given the importance of critical reactions for argumentation studies, it is essential to 
develop guidelines for identifying and distinguishing types of critical reactions and the norms 
that govern them, and for that reason I am enthusiastic about Johnson’s project of developing 
a theory of criticism (see also: Johnson 2000). 
There are many types of critical reaction. Some well-known members of this family 
are: attack, challenge, charge, counterargument, counterconsideration, critical question, 
criticism, critique, defeater, denial, objection, rebuttal, refutation, rejoinder, undercutter, and 
there are quite a number more. I conceive of a critical reaction as the product of the dialogical 
contribution where a dialogue participant responds to a conversational contribution of an 
interlocutor (present or absent, real or imaginary) by negatively evaluating this contribution, 
or at least part of it, or by preparing for such a negative evaluation by challenging this 
interlocutor to repair an alleged flaw or omission. Four parameters can be distinguished that 
seem to be required in order to provide a more or less complete characterization of a critical 
reaction of some type. Johnson’s concepts are critical reactions at quite high levels of 
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generality. After quoting his definitions of “objection” and “criticism,” I proceed by analyzing 
the concepts by means of the four parameters, labelled focus, norm, level and force.  
Johnson proposes the following definition of “objection”: An objection is “(1) a 
response to an argument that (2) expresses propositional content that (3) presents a challenge, 
difficulty or some possible impediment to the goal of being rationally persuaded by the 
argument.” Johnson’s proposed definition of criticism is: “a criticism of an argument is (1) the 
expression of propositional content that (2) claims that the argument suffers from a defect (or 
defects) and (3) provides appropriate support for the claim.” I must confess that I do not have 
clear linguistic intuitions about how to define “objection” or “criticism,” probably because I 
am only a fluent speaker of Broken English, and my comments are mainly motivated by a 
desire for clarity and methodological fruitfulness. 
First, a critical reaction has a focus, as it is about something, and responds to a 
contribution, or to a part of it, or to a configuration of parts. A critical reaction may have a 
propositional focus, for instance on the argument’s premise, its conclusion or its connection. 
Instead of a propositional focus, a critical reaction may have a locutional focus, or a personal 
or situational one. According to Johnson’s definitions, both objections and criticisms are 
focused on an argument, or at least a part of an argument. As we shall see, an objection does 
not contain an argument, in Johnson’s view, so that one implication of his theory seems to be 
that one cannot object to an objection, and the term “counter-objection” is contradictory. A 
desire to heed ordinary language might provides a reason to broaden the concept of objection, 
so as to allow for objections of other dialectical objects than arguments. A difference between 
the two concepts that Johnson identifies is that objection is less, and criticism is more focused, 
in the sense that criticism is more than objection targeted at a specific part of the argument. 
Second, a critical reaction appeals at a norm, as it evaluates the element focused on, or 
at least prepares for such an evaluation. For example, the critical reaction’s evaluation may 
come down to the assessment that the argument fails to discharge the required burden of 
proof, or that it is not clearly formulated, or that it is ugly, or strategically weak, and so forth. 
As becomes clear from Johnson’s comments on his definitions, both objections and criticisms 
appeal to norms for rational persuasion, rather than some other kind of norm, such as an 
aesthetic or ethical one. 
Third, a critical reaction is advanced at a particular level of discussion, such as the 
ground level of dialogue when contributing quite directly to the issue at hand, or at a meta-
level of dialogue when making evaluative comment about the course of the dialogue, for 
example by making a procedural objection, or by making evaluative comments about the 
strategy to be adopted. Johnson’s reference to procedural objections suggest that objections 
may be advanced both at ground as well as at meta-levels of dialogue. The same applies, I 
expect, to criticism. 
Fourth and finally, a critical reaction has an illocutionary force, as it is a verbal 
contribution itself, and made up from one or more speech acts. For example, a critical reaction 
can be a denial, or a request for argument, or a request for clarification, or counter-
argumentation, and so forth. In the remainder of this commentary I deal with differences in 
force. 
It becomes clear from Johnson’s definitions that the main difference between an 
objection and a criticism is that the former is less dialectically developed and the latter more 
dialectically developed, in the specific sense that former need not contain assertion or 
argument and the latter does involve assertion and argument, so that they clearly are 
connected with different illocutionary forces.1 An objection may just present a challenge and 
a critical test, rather than an allegation of wrongdoing. However, the evidence that Johnson 
                                                          
1 Given that there is a clause that requires criticism to contain appropriate support, I wonder whether the 
definiendum should be “appropriate criticism,” rather than “criticism.” 
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offers in support of this way of conceptualizing the distinction is suggestive of reasoning as 
being constitutive of objection. First, I want to emphasize the reasoning element in objections. 
Then, I will discuss how, nevertheless, the concept of an objection can be understood in line 
with Johnson’s assumption that objections do not contain arguments.  
As I understand the definition, the propositional content expressed in an objection is 
not the same propositional content as the proposition that is evaluated negatively, so that if a 
proponent asserts “P,” the opponent’s mere challenge “Why P?” or her mere denial “not-P” 
does not count as an objection to P. Consequently, the propositional content expressed in an 
objection must be some other proposition, say Q, that the opponent advances in opposition to 
the proponent’s argument. Q apparently underlies the opponent’s evaluation of the 
proponent’s argument, even if the evaluation only amounts to the idea that the arguer’s stance 
is doubtful. According to this reading, both criticism and objection involve reasoning, with Q 
as a premise and some kind of negative evaluation as its conclusion. But if both involve 
reasoning, where is the difference? One possible solution to this problem of interpretation is 
that the reasoning  has different functions when it comes to objection and criticism. 
First, the reasoning of the critic can constitute counter-argumentation, which is an 
attempt to convince the arguer to accept the denial of something this arguer at an earlier stage 
has asserted or implied. This seems to be the function of reasoning in criticism. Second, the 
function of the reasoning may be that of explaining to the arguer what motivates the critic to 
evaluate the arguer’s argument unfavourably. For example, if the critic thinks that the arguer’s 
assertion P (e.g. one of the reasons offered to the critic) is false, she may advance 
counterconsideration Q, not in an attempt to convince him to adopt not-P, but in an attempt to 
make him understand what motivates her to doubt P and to entertain the possibility that P is 
false. In such cases, the opponent reasons, but she does not advance an argument, for the 
measure of the reasoning’s success is not whether it convinces the arguer on ground he 
considers acceptable, but whether it clarifies to the arguer what motivates the critic (cf. on 
cautious assertions: Rescher, 1977). Such an objection can be very helpful to the arguer, as it 
informs him about the argumentative strategy to adopt in order to stand a chance of 
convincing this particular critic. After all, if he knows what motivates the critic to challenge 
P, he knows what proposition to refute in order to take away the critic’s doubts. In this case, 
the arguer should show that Q is false or insufficient to undermine his assertion that P. So one 
way of understanding Johnson’s distinction between objection and criticism is that both 
contain reasoning, but in the case of objection the reasoning constitutes explanation, whereas 
in the case of criticism the reasoning constitutes counter-argumentation. 
Let’s take a look at one of Johnson’s examples of an objection: “But how do you 
distinguish between X and Y?”. This can be rephrased, Johnson explains, as an objection:  
“your position does not allow for a distinction between X and Y.” In my reading of such an 
objection, reasoning is involved, and the reasoning at hand can be phrased as: “I am still in 
doubt about the position that you adopt and what underlies my position of doubt is that, as far 
as you have shown, your position does not allow for a distinction between X and Y.” Similar 
pieces of reasoning can be construed for Johnson’s other examples. 
My reading of Johnson’s distinction has the further advantage of doing justice to parts 
of the dictionary definitions of “objection” that Johnson refers to. The definition of 
“objection” that I found in the online version of the American Heritage Dictionary makes use 
of the phrase “a ground, reason, or cause for expressing opposition.” And the online version 
of Merriam Webster Dictionary defines “objection” in terms of “a reason for disagreeing with 
or opposing something.” These clauses suggest that an objection involves reasoning, for some 
purpose or other.  
A consequence of my reading of “objection” is that, even though an objection need not 
contain an argument, the existence of reasoning makes an objection not less dialectically 
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developed than a criticism, and the normative importance Johnson attaches to the distinction – 
according to which an arguer should give priority to criticisms over objections when 
responding to critics – may need reconsideration. 
A final comment. Johnson observes that some lexical definitions of “criticism” make 
mention of the idea of carefulness, whereas those of objection do not. This aspect of the 
difference between the two concepts, however, does not return in Johnson’s own definitions. 
Neither can it be adequately grasped by the four parameters that I have used. It might be 
worthwhile to characterize some critical reactions (objections, for example) as befitting 
situations where advocacy and competition is appropriate, such as the argumentation stage of 
a persuasion dialogue, and other critical reactions (criticisms, for example) as befitting 
situations that are less heated and where a more cooperative inquiry is appropriate, such as the 
concluding stage of a persuasion dialogue. 
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